Introduction
From the 1970s onwards, employment rates of older people decreased significantly in the OECD. Despite this overall trend, we can observe a remarkable cross-country variation in the extent of early exit from the labour market. Although different OECD-countries started from quite similar levels in the post-war decades, by 1995, the male employment rate for the age group between 55 and 64 years was about 80 per cent in Switzerland and Japan while it was as low as 34 per cent in Belgium and France. As pension systems came under strain, due to demographic aging as well as diminishing possibilities and political willingness to increase revenues, closing the various early exit options from the labour market for older workers became one of the prime policy goals from the late 1990s onwards and 'active ageing' became the new buzzword. While employment has indeed increased in virtually all countries, large differences remain. What explains these cross-national differences in the extent of early exit?
The decision to retire early is made by individual workers and is, of course, influenced by individual circumstances, including poor health, job satisfaction and the depreciation of skills.
However, this is clearly not the whole story. A large literature in economics and sociology has analyzed the ways in which incentives embedded in the social security system provide pathways that make early exit from the labour force more likely (Blöndal and Scarpetta, 1998; Börsch-Supan et al., 2009; Damman et al., 2011; Engelhardt, 2012; Gruber and Wise, 1999; Kubicek et al., 2010; Siegrist et al., 2007; Wahrendorf et al., 2012; Wang, 2012) .
1 It has been demonstrated that macro-level welfare state institutions providing pathways to early retirement are a key determinant of retirement decisions, explaining a large share of variance 4 in labour market participation and exit, even when controlling for individual-level characteristics (Börsch-Supan et al., 2009; Engelhardt, 2012) .
In this paper, we argue that the politics of early exit -and of 'active ageing', understood here as rolling back early exit policies 2 -diverge from the traditional class-based logic of welfare state development, represented by the power resources approach (Huber and Stephens, 2001; Korpi, 1983) . Rather than factors such as the strength of trade unions or the partisan composition of government, it is the structure of industrial relations and sectoral politics that explain cross-national differences in early retirement. We find that in the case of decentralized industrial relations the prevalence of early exit is higher, which indicates a sectoral rather than class-based logic. Costs of industrial restructuring are shifted from sectors exposed to global competition to sheltered and service sectors. Externalization leads to higher early exit rates and a slower reversal of early exit trends. By contrast, early exit is low under conditions of a highly centralized industrial relations system when the cost-shifting game does not work.
Similar arguments have mainly been made by qualitative single-country or small-N studies so far (Ebbinghaus, 2006; Hartlapp and Kemmerling, 2008; Mares, 2001; Trampusch, 2005) .
Our study is thus the first large-N analysis focusing specifically on the political economy of early exit.
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Our findings must be seen against the background of the more general literature on welfare state development and reform. The still dominant view of the welfare state is that it is a product of class politics. Left power resources are considered the most important drivers of extensive protections against the most common risks wage earners and their families are facing in a capitalist economy. More importantly, class politics seem to explain large part of the variation between advanced economies when it comes to welfare state institutions and 2 We are aware that employment is only one aspect of the multifaceted concept of active ageing (Boudiny, 2013) . 3 Hartlapp and Kemmerling's article (2008) is a partial exception, as they embed their case studies in comparative data.
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outcomes. While we do not wish to reject this view wholesale, our findings help to add nuance to the common views about the politics of welfare state research. We will discuss the implications of our findings in more detail in the conclusion.
The paper proceeds as follows: In the next section, we describe the patterns of early exit over time and across countries in the OECD since 1975. In the theory section, we discuss the literature on the macro-determinants of early exit and develop a set of hypotheses. The section that follows presents the model and the data used to test our main hypotheses while controlling for important socio-structural and economic factors. We go on to present our results. The final section sums up and concludes.
From early exit to active ageing: Examining the basic empirical pattern
Decreasing employment participation of older workers is the product not only of individual preferences and circumstances but also of incentives embedded in public policies. A number of authors have shown, for example, that early exit rates are sensitive to differences and changes in early retirement pension rules (Bassanini and Duval, 2006; Blöndal and Scarpetta, 1998; Duval, 2003 ). Yet we also know from the qualitative literature in comparative welfare state research that in most countries there exists not a single early exit scheme but 'a complex multitude of exit opportunities across diverse public programs and private welfare arrangements' (Ebbinghaus, 2006: 10) or early exit 'pathways' (Kohli et al., 1991) .
The most important policy instruments allowing for early exit are special provisions in old age pensions (e.g. an early or flexible statutory retirement age), special pre-retirement provisions in unemployment insurance (e.g. waiving the obligation to look for work, extra long-term benefits), lenient regulation of disability benefits (e.g. taking general labour market conditions into account in the decision to grant benefits) and a favourable tax regime for 6 private-sector early retirement policies (e.g. for company severance pay, sectoral early retirement funds, part-time employment rules). Through these and other means, the state can directly promote or subsidize labour market exit for older workers (De Deken, 2002; Eichhorst, 2011; Gieselink et al., 2002; Van der Veen and Trommel, 1999) . Early exit into an old age pension tends to be available only from age 60 in many countries, while a special unemployment status and disability benefits are often available from age 55 or even earlier.
Historically, early exit policies were often officially promoted as an instrument against unemployment, particularly youth unemployment, through the replacement of older workers with young people at the beginning of their career.
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Since there are multiple and complex institutional 'pathways' of early exit which are impossible to capture with a single policy indicator, we focus on the central outcome measure of early exit policies in our analysis, namely employment rates of older workers. Figure 1 shows the mean employment ratio of older workers across countries. In the first period from 1975 until 1994 the employment ratio of older workers decreased in nearly all countries of our sample (the one exception is Italy). The figure illustrates that on average the ratio of older workers dropped by 13 per cent. In contrast, in the second half of our observation period, the employment ratio increased by 7.3 per cent on average across all countries. 'Active ageing' thus appears to be more than just a buzzword in the OECD. To reveal the country-specific paths, figure 2 presents the national patterns of employment rates of older workers for the same period. The figure confirms that despite large differences in the level of employment rates of older workers across countries, the broad development For our purposes, the most interesting phenomenon are not the changes over time but the enormous differences in employment levels between countries which show that early exit was used much less in some countries than in others. As figure 3 reveals, this is reflected in the average employment ratio of older male workers by country across the entire period. The employment rate for older male workers was -and often still is -particularly low in many continental European countries (except Switzerland) and much higher in Scandinavia and in most English-speaking countries as well as in Japan (Hofäcker and Pollnerová, 2006) . To examine whether the identified cross-national differences purely reflect the cross-national variation in overall employment rates, we additionally look at a further indicator, namely what we call the employment gap. The employment gap of older workers is the difference between average employment rates of older men and the overall male working age population (see figure 4) . Just like in the case of employment rates, lower values reflect stronger incidence of early exit. The figure reveals that the country ranking is very similar to the one in What explains these large cross-national differences in the employment ratio of older workers and in the employment gap? Why did countries follow different trajectories with regard to these early exit outcomes?
The political economy of early exit: Sectoral or class-based logics?
According to one logic, early exit can be understood as a response to increased pressure for industrial restructuring (Ebbinghaus, 2006) . Why? The pressure stems from the twin process of the rise of the knowledge economy and economic globalization. Older workers should be particularly affected by globalization, due to (perceptions of) lower flexibility, high wages and outdated skills. Naturally, not all companies are subject to these pressures to the same extent. The imperative of restructuring should be highest in exposed, high value-added manufacturing parts of the economy. This is indeed the case. Blöndal and Scarpetta (1998) show for 13 countries that the incidence of early retirement tends to be higher in manufacturing relative to the average across all industries -sometimes as much as twice as high. It is also high in mining and quarrying, construction and transportation, probably due to the physically demanding nature of these occupations, and lower than average in industries such as agriculture and fisheries, hotels and restaurants, wholesale and retail trade as well as real estate. Sheltered and/or low-productivity sectors should, however, try to work against early exit as they are either not subject to globalization pressures to the same extent or suffer more from higher taxes that accompany early retirement. 5 The expansion of early exit and the speed of reversal of such policies thus depend on whether sectors in need of restructuring can shift the transition costs to the general public, thereby creating a redistribution of the costs of adjustment towards sectors with lower adjustment pressure. In the manufacturing sectors, say, the metalworking industry, both employers and trade unions should be in favour of public early exit pathways, as it can be seen as a way of increasing productivity without having to resort to excessive wage moderation or expensive layoffs (which may be virtually off limits anyway, in countries with high employment protection). It is a logic of intersectoral cost- (Olson, 1982) , externalization should be most difficult when organized interests are 'encompassing'. Encompassing organizationsboth employer and employee organizations -do not allow high value-added tradable industries to shift their cost to low-productivity industries in the sheltered parts of the economy in order to stay competitive in globalized markets. In more decentralized settings, however, such cost-shifting is possible. Here, cross-class coalitions can lobby the government for public early exit financed by taxes or social security contributions. The 'encompassing' character of an organization should be reflected in the degree of bargaining coordination, ranging from fragmented, firm or plant-based bargaining to high coordination either through centralized bargaining by peak organizations or through a high degree of de facto coordination across sectors (e.g. via highly synchronized bargaining). The degree of bargaining coordination conditions whether sectors subject to restructuring pressure, especially manufacturing, can influence the government. Therefore, this sectoral hypothesis can be formulated as follows:
H2: The possibilities for tradable industries to bargain for early exit policies should be higher in countries where the level of bargaining coordination of industrial relations is low.
14 An alternative perspective would not stress the dynamics triggered by economic restructuring in different industries, but the overall balance of power between labour and capital. This is the traditional power resource logic of comparative welfare state research (Castles, 1978; EspingAndersen, 1985; Huber and Stephens, 2001; Korpi, 1983; Korpi and Palme, 2003) . In contrast to the cross-class alliances expected by the sectoral perspective, the power resource approach stresses the antagonism between employers and trade unions (and their allies in the parliamentary arena). Public welfare state benefits are, according to this logic, typically decommodifying, that is, they decrease the dependence of wage-earners (and their dependent family members) from the labour market (Esping-Andersen, 1990). Early exit schemes, whether institutionalized as unemployment or pensions benefits, seem to fit this pattern. They allow older workers to have a decent standard of living without having to rely on wage labour at any cost. In other words, they are de-commodifying. 'Active ageing', by contrast, can be seen as a re-commodifying policy, forcing older workers to look for work or update their skills to be able to gain a livelihood in the labour market. From this perspective, the expansion of welfare state programs -de-commodifying benefits, in particular -is generally driven by the strength of the labour movement, represented by well-organized trade unions and social democratic governments working against organized employers and their allies, especially conservative or market-liberal parties. Conversely, we can expect employers and right-ofcenter parties to try to cut back early exit benefits or close early exit pathways altogether.
Power resources theory would thus expect that early exit increases -and hence employment rates of older workers fall -under social democratic governments. Social democrats should be more likely to try to de-commodify those parts of the labour force that are affected by restructuring (and social democrats should be slower to adopt active ageing policies, due to their re-commodifying nature). Hence: At the same time, labour market policies such as early exit pathways often originate in the industrial relations arena. Jensen (2012) has shown that while for areas such as pensions and family policies, it is clearly the partisan composition that shapes social expenditure patterns, in areas closer to the labour market, the main channel of working-class interests lies outside parliament. From this perspective, trade union strength -measured in terms of trade union density -rather than the partisan composition of government should have a positive effect on early exit, that is, a negative effect on the employment rate of older workers. This leads to the following hypothesis on power resources in the industrial relations arena:
H4: The higher the trade union density the lower employment rates of older workers.
Method and Data
To test which of the two perspectives is the more appropriate one we apply panel regressions.
In our panel regressions two different measures for our dependent variables are used: first, the employment rates of older (male) workers 7 and second, the employment gap, that is, the deviation of employment of older male workers to the overall male employment ratio. Using outcome measure instead of policy measures enables capturing the various incentives towards early exit embedded in different welfare states. For example, in many countries, the main exit 7 The subject of this study is male employment above the age of 55. Female employment is driven less by early retirement but by a much more long-term secular trend: increased labour market participation, due to cultural change and educational advances. In order to sharply focus on just one of the two stories -i.e. the politics of early exit -we exclude female employment.
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routes were not through the pension system but through the unemployment or disability insurance.
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Our first measure of the dependent variable is the number of employed males between 55 and 64 years in relation to the total number of males between 55 and 64 of age. Higher rates of early exit from the labour market should hence be visible in lower employment rates.
Although labour force participation instead of employment rates is sometimes the preferred indicator, data availability is better for employment rates. In any case, unemployment rates of older workers tend to be very low (Hofäcker and Pollnerová, 2006: 33-35) , which means that the correlation of employment rates and participation rates is extremely high for this group (r=.99). We look at absolute exit rates at point t, not cohort-adjusted relative exit rates. Our second measure is the difference between the overall employment ratio of males to the employment ratio of older workers. This indicator allows us to capture the extent to which the employment ratio of older workers deviate from the overall trend and therefore indirectly control for differences in cross-national general employment patterns. The sample includes 21
OECD countries and covers the period from 1975 until 2010. The countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States.
In the panel regressions, we do not include country fixed effects since many of the variables of interest are largely time-invariant and fixed effects would eliminate the very cross-country 8 A correlation between this indicator and comparative information about early exit reforms strongly supports that employment rates of older workers is a good proxy for early exit policies. The comparative information on early exit reforms comes from the fRDB-IZA Social Reforms Database on changes in employment policy in 14 EU countries over the period 1980 -2007 (Anelli et al., 2014 . Reforms that open early exit pathways clearly lead to a decrease of employment rates while the restriction of early exit options is followed by an increase in the participation of older workers in the labour market. This shows that our dependent variable is a valid proxy of early exit policies. The correlation is negative and statistically significant at least at the 1 per cent level.
differences we are interested in (Plümper and Tröger, 2007) . 9 To deal with panel heteroscedasticity, we estimate our models with panel corrected standard errors. Furthermore, in all models, first-order autocorrelation is present. We therefore estimate the models with first-order autoregressive disturbances. All models include time trend variables that capture the overall temporal dynamics. As we cannot exclude problems of endogeneity, we applied a Durbin Wu Hausman Test to check for endogeneity and, in the case of endogeneity, used the first and second lags of the endogenous independent variables as instruments.
In order to test hypothesis H1 concerning the sectoral logic, we control for the size of the The strength of left parties is captured by the share of cabinet seats held by leftist parties (H3). Some authors contend that rather than social democrats, we should expect the main advocates of early exit to be Christian democrats and other centrist parties. After all, these parties have used the strategy of limiting labour supply in other contexts, too, especially with respect to female employment (Hartlapp and Kemmerling, 2008; von Rhein-Kress, 1993 ). We therefore also control for the cabinet share of centrist parties. Trade union density (H4) is 9 In some cases fixed effects models are even more biased than simple pooled OLS (see Plümper and Troeger, 2013 for a detailed discussion).
18 measured by net union membership in relation to the total number of employees. 10 See table A1 in the appendix for details on data sources.
We include a comprehensive set of control variables. The pressure to increase productivity and efficiency by reducing the employment ratio of older workers should be stronger in economies that are highly integrated into the global market. As an indicator of economic globalization, we use the trade openness of the economy. The indicator measures the sum of imports and exports in relation to the GDP. In order to control for the demographic structure, we include the share of elderly population (65+) in relation to the total population. We expect adjustment pressure to be higher when the share of elderly people is high (i.e. a negative relationship with employment rates). However, a high share of elderly people logically implies a lower share of younger people, which could lead to lower pressure to replace older workers with younger ones (i.e. the relationship may also be positive). A government's room to develop early exit policies should also be conditioned by institutional veto points. We use the index compiled by Henisz (2010) to control for institutional constraints and assume that early exit policies are easier to implement where there are fewer veto points. In other words, we expect a positive effect of veto points on employment rates. The growth of the real GDP captures the cyclical economic dynamics. In times of high economic growth, restructuring pressure should be lower (positive effect on employment). On the other hand, high growth leads to higher public revenue which could open up opportunities for generous support of early retirement (negative effect). In a similar vein, when the public debt is high, early exit should be lower (and hence employment rates of older workers higher). Furthermore, when the unemployment rate is high, the prospect of re-employment is particularly unfavourable for older employees. Therefore, we assume a negative effect on employment levels of older 10 For reasons of restricted data availability, we have to concentrate on organization representing employees. However, qualitative studies have emphasized the importance of employers for the politics of early exit. Further research should focus on the systematic collection of information on the structure and strength of employers for a broad set of countries. Such data is necessary to appropriately address the inter-and intrasectoral bargaining processes leading to early exit.
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workers. The overall health status of old people in a society should be relevant, too. The more healthy older people are, the lower should be the productivity losses and the higher the preferences to stay in work. The life expectancy of males at 60 -which is correlated with more nuanced indicators of individual health status (Milligan and Wise, 2012) -is used as a proxy for the health status of old male people (OECD, 2012) . The measurement of all variables is described in further detail in table A1 in the appendix. The first model that only includes the control variables shows that globalization reinforces early exit. The pressure to restructure employment and to replace older workers is stronger in countries highly integrated into the international market. In contrast, the cabinet share of centrist parties does not make a difference for early exit. Furthermore, a demographic structure characterized by a high proportion of elderly people is associated with a high employment rate of older workers (and a low deviation from overall employment rate of male workers). Contrary to expectations, the overall institutional environment (veto points) does not influence early exit. The effects of GDP growth and public debt levels are highly statistically significant. High growth and a high level of public debt are associated with low employment of older people. With regard to the overall labour market situation, the employment ratio of older workers is closely related to the national unemployment rate. For the employment rate, the coefficient is negative and statistically significant at the 0.1 per cent level, while it is positive for the employment gap. The reason for this is simply that high unemployment decreases the overall employment rate, which ceteris paribus should also decrease the gap between the employment of older persons and the rest. 11 Moreover, as expected, a high life expectancy -which we use as a proxy for healthy older workers -is associated with a great number of people above 55 still being employed.
Results
In model II, we tested the traditional power resource logic of comparative welfare state research. In all models, the coefficient of left government has the expected negative sign, but is only statistically significant in one model (table 2, model III). It is plausible that this result is driven by two conflicting objectives of left-wing parties. While social democratic parties have traditionally advanced de-commodification, they also typically strive at maximizing labour force participation, including the participation of older workers -not least in order to be able to pay for generous social programmes. If anything, the latter goal has become stronger during the period under review, with the rise of Third Way social democracy. This is 11 Note that the employment gap = employment ratio of older workers -overall employment ratio.
23 also in line with Esping-Andersen's verdict that Conservative welfare states, but not Social Democratic ones, were caught in a 'welfare without work' trap in the 1990s (EspingAndersen, 1996) . The results for trade union density are also mixed. Interestingly, and contrary to theoretical expectations, the coefficient is positive in all models. When using the employment ratio of older workers as dependent variable, however, the coefficients are far from being statistically significant. It only turns out to be statistically significant in the employment gap models in table 2. This means that in countries with strong trade unions, early exit is lower and the difference between the employment of older workers and the general (male) population is small, which is not in line with theoretical expectations. Overall, the class politics perspective on early exit is not supported by our results. While the indicators of the power resources of labour explain some of the variation in some models, they are inconsistent as they go in different directions. Overall, whether countries go for early exit strategies or not is less a question of the balance of power between labour and capital but rather a question of the structure of the industrial relations, that is, the setting in which the relevant actors operate. Early exit is a dominant strategy when sectors highly under pressure for adjustment are widely represented in the economy and when those sectors are able to shift the costs for adjustment to the overall economy. Left-wing parties only matter to a limited extent due to the conflicting goals they pursue with regard to early exit. Nor is there an alternative partisan logic at work, as the coefficient of centrist governments is also instable. And finally, trade union density has the exact opposite effect than left partisanship, and only with regard to one of our measures of early exit.
Conclusion
The large differences in early exit policies and outcomes have caught the attention of scholars and policy-makers alike. retains an important status in many national economies in the developed world, it has been forced to transform itself from Fordist mass-production into a more specialized type of production based on highly productive and knowledge-intensive labour. This process was accelerated by the Oil Shocks of the 1970s. Early exit has been used by manufacturing employers to reduce their workforce and thereby increase productivity.
But this is only part of the story. How this pressure is resolved, also depends on the structure of economic interest representation. When cross-sectoral coordination is low, employers and trade unions in manufacturing firms can organize to push the government to subsidize their restructuring costs via early exit policies and thereby shift costs towards sheltered parts of the economy. Such externalization of costs is not possible when sectors are highly coordinated and the organization of economic interests is encompassing. Our findings can thus be read against the background of a strand in the literature on the political economy of wage setting which expects that centralized and encompassing unions cannot externalize the costs of excessive wage inflation on society as a whole.
One important alternative explanation was also tested, i.e. class-based policy-making. Yet this perspective did not have a robust and unambiguous impact on early exit outcomes. This broadly goes against the main thrust of mainstream comparative welfare state research. It is true that the class-based view became subject to heavy criticism in the 1990s and 2000s 26 (Mares, 2003; Swenson, 2002) . While our results on early exit are certainly not in line with the power resources view, we are aware that early retirement is not a typical social policy, either. It represents a -perhaps rare -policy option on which (some) employers and (some) employees can agree under certain economic conditions. Similar temporal cross-class alliances can be found during imminent economic shocks, for example, when employers and trade unions lobby in favour of short-time work policies which tend to be equally biased towards manufacturing (Sacchi et al., 2011) . Our results can also be read against the background of insider-outsider theories of the welfare state (Rueda, 2006) . Highly organized manufacturing workers are the prototypical insiders of the post-war industrial model. We have shown that in the aftermath of the Oil Shocks, it was possible for their representatives to shift the costs of industrial downsizing to the overall economy. Rather than pitting a uniform class-based logic against a sectoral one, comparative political economy and welfare state research should aim at identifying the economic and institutional context conditions under which one rather than the other tends to prevail.
In terms of policy implications, the article also demonstrates why some governments find it much harder to reform early retirement and turn towards 'active ageing' strategies than others.
Not only does the economic adjustment pressure differ strongly between countries, some governments are also facing strong sectoral interest groups, sometimes with cross-class alliances acting against the interests of other sectors. Other governments deal with more encompassing industrial relations actors which are forced to internalize their conflicts about industrial restructuring. Our results imply that different political logics call for different political strategies on the path towards 'active ageing'. (2005) OECD ( 
